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STATEMENT QF ISSUES 
1 . Whether the a f f idav i t in support of the search 
warrant which was i ssued and executed in t h i s case s u f f i c i e n t l y 
es tab l i shed probable cause for the search warrant. 
a. Whether the information in the a f f idav i t was 
so s t a l e as t o negate probable cause. 
b. Whether the a f f idav i t s u f f i c i e n t l y e s tab l i shed 
the r e l i a b i l i t y of the conf ident ia l informant who provided the 
information in the a f f i d a v i t . 
2 . Whether a second search warrant was required t o 
enable the o f f i c e r ' s to open a locked box discovered during the 
search under the f i r s t warrant. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 21016 
vs. : 
KELLY HANSEN, : Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Kelly Hansen, was charged with possession of 
a controlled substance with intent to distribute for value, a 
third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(ii) (1974). 
Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute for value as charged in a 
bench trial held October 22, 1985 in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
George E. Bailif, presiding. The court sentenced defendant for a 
term not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison and fined 
him $500.00. 
This appeal is a companion case to State of Utah v. 
Dale Hundley, case no. 860063, also pending on appeal. The 
issues raised in both appeals relating to the search of 
defendants1 residences are virtually identical. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 16 , 1985, a search warrant was issued to 
o f f i c e r s to search an apartment located at 1097 North 150 West, 
Or em, Utah. The warrant was based upon an a f f i d a v i t presented to 
a magistrate that morning (R. 97) which s ta ted that a r e l i a b l e 
informant, who had provided information in the past resu l t ing in 
several arres t s and conv ic t ions , had been in the apartment at the 
above address on August 11th and saw a large amount of marijuana 
being sold in smaller q u a n t i t i e s (R. 9 8 ) . (See Addendum A.) 
At approximately 10:00 a.m. on August 16 , 1985, four 
o f f i c e r s from Orem City entered an apartment building located at 
1097 North 150 West, Orem, Utah, pursuant to the search warrant 
i ssued that morning (R. 74 -77 ) . At the time of the search, 
defendant, Keily Hansen, and Dale Hundley resided at that 
loca t ion (R. 76 -77 ) . During the search of Mr. Hundley's room, 
o f f i c e r s found a green metal box secured by a padlock (R. 7 9 - 8 0 ) . 
Hundley denied knowing the whereabouts of a key that would 
unlock the box; however, o f f i c e r s found a key that f i t the lock 
ins ide Hundley's pants' pocket (R. 80-81) . Off icers a l so found a 
matching key in the possess ion of defendant (R. 8 2 ) . Prior to 
opening the box, Officer Edwards smelled the box and detected an 
odor of marijuana (R. 79-bO). Upon opening the metal box, 
o f f i c e r s discovered a small measuring s c a l e and a p l a s t i c bag 
f i l l e d with approximately one-quarter pound of marijuana (R. 8 1 , 
83 -83 ) . After Officer Edwards read defendant h i s Miranda r i g h t s , 
detendant confessed t o the o f f i c e r s that the marijuana belonged 
s o l e l y t o him and that he had been s e l l i n g smaller q u a n t i t i e s of 
the drug for spending money (R. 8 6 - 8 9 ) . 
The court denied a motion to suppress evidence obtained 
from the search (R. 39 , 78) and subsequently found defendant 
g u i l t y of possess ion of a control led substance with intent to 
d i s t r i b u t e for value (R. 102) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The a f f i d a v i t provided t o the magistrate on August 16, 
1985 s ta t ing that a conf ident ia l informant observed i l l e g a l 
a c t i v i t y on August 1 1 , 1985, did not s e t forth s t a l e information 
of criminal a c t i v i t y . 
Further, the a f f i d a v i t contained s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s of 
the r e l i a b i l i t y of the conf ident ia l informant. The informant 
personal ly observed the marijuana being so ld at defendant's 
apartment, and had a s s i s t e d po l i ce o f f i c e r s in the past by 
providing inrormation resu l t ing in several arres t s and 
conv ic t ions . 
F ina l ly , po l ice o f f i c e r s were j u s t i f i e d in opening a 
locked metal box, s ince i t was found within the residence named 
in the warrant, and i t was a l i k e l y place to hide marijuana. 
ARS9MPNT 
POINT I 
THE AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED SUFFICIENT PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH 
WARRANT 
Defendant a l l e g e s the a f f i d a v i t supporting the search 
warrant i s de fec t ive due t o : (1) the lapse of time between the 
observation of the informant and the s igning of the a f f i d a v i t in 
suupport of the search warrant; and (2) i n s u f f i c i e n t information 
for the magistrate to determine that probable cause e x i s t e d . 
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The r ight to be free from unreasonable searches and 
se i zures i s guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the United 
S t a t e s Const i tut ion and A r t i c l e I , S 14 of the Utah Const i tut ion . 
The S ta te i s aware that t h i s Court has recent ly suggested that 
the State cons t i tu t iona l standard could be construed to expand 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l protect ion beyond that mandated by the United 
S t a t e s Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Ear l . 
716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); S ta te v. Hvqh. 711 P.2d 264, 271-73 
(Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J . , concurring); however, t h i s Court has 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y construed Art i c l e I , S 14 and the Fourth Amendment, 
which t e x t u a l l y are nearly i d e n t i c a l , as providing the same scope 
of p r o t e c t i o n . See £.<}.# S ta te v. Cr i sco la , 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 
P.2d 517 (1968); State v. Lopes . 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976) . There 
i s no good reason here to construe A r t i c l e I , § 14 more narrowly 
than the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted , s ince the case at 
bar invo lves a search and se izure of evidence pursuant t o a 
search warrant, which area of law has been c l e a r l y s e t forth and 
wel l def ined. See a l so State v. Babbell , no. 21033, Respondents 
Brief Point I for a complete d i scuss ion of t h i s i s s u e . Point I 
of Respondents Babbell brief addressing t h i s i s s u e i s attached 
as Addendum C of t h i s br ief . 
In reviewing the v a l i d i t y of a search warrant, t h i s 
Court has shown great deference t o a magis trate ' s determination 
of probable cause. State v . Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1286 (Utah 
1983); S tate v. Romero. 660 P.2d 715 , 719 (Utah 1983) . The 
standard of probable cause r e l i e d upon by magistrates in i s su ing 
search warrants i s probabi l i ty , not a prima f a c i e showing, of 
criminal a c t i v i t y . State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1286 (Utah 
1983); S tate v. Fort , 572 P.2d 1387, 1399 (Utah 1977) . In the 
case at bar the a f f i d a v i t provided t o the magistrate se t forth 
s u f f i c i e n t probable cause t o warrant the issuance of the search 
warrant. 
A. THE INFORMATION THE MAGISTRATE RELIED 
UPON IN ISSUING THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS 
NOT STALE. 
Defendant claims that because the informant observed 
marijuana being sold on August 1 1 , 1985, but did not s ign the 
a f f idav i t unt i l August 16 , 1985, the information was s t a l e and 
thus, probable cause t o i s sue the search warrant did not e x i s t . 
Af f idav i t s for search warrants must be tes ted by 
magistrates and courts in a common-sense fash ion . State v. 
Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258r 1261 (Utah 1983) , c i t i n g United S ta tes 
v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). The reso lut ion of 
marginal cases should l a r g e l y be determined by the preference to 
be accorded warrants. Anderton, 668 P.2d at 1261 r c i t i n g Jones 
v . United S t a t e s , 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1959) . As s tated by the 
United S ta te s Supreme Court in I l l i n o i s v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213 
(1983): 
[Wle have repeatedly said that a f t e r - t h e - f a c t 
scrut iny by courts of the su f f i c i ency of an 
a f f i d a v i t should not take the form of de. novo 
review. A magis trate ' s "determination of 
probable cause should be paid great deference 
by reviewing courts ." S p i n e l l i t supra, at 
419. "A grudging or negative a t t i tude by re-
viewing courts toward warrants," Ventresca, 
380 U .S . , at 108, i s incons i s tent with the 
Fourth Amendment's strong preference for 
searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; 
"courts should not inva l ida te warrant[s] by 
interpret ing af f idavi tCs l in a hypertechnical , 
rather than a commonsense, manner." I_d., a t 
109. 
462 U.S. at 236. 
Proof of f a c t s supporting probable cause must be 
c l o s e l y re la ted t o the issuance of a search warrant t o j u s t i f y a 
f inding of probable cause at the time the warrant i s i s sued . 
Sqro v. United S t a t e s , 287 U.S. 206
 r 210 (1932). A search 
warrant i s said t o be s t a l e when the date the incriminating 
evidence i s observed i s so remote in time from the date of 
appl icat ion for the warrant as t o render i t improbable that the 
evidence s t i l l e x i s t s at the s ta ted l o c a t i o n . Garza v. S t a t e , 
120 Tex. Crim. 147, 149, 48 S.W.2d 625 (1932); Davidson v . S t a t e , 
458 A.2d 875, 880 (Md. App. 1983) . Whether the information i s 
s t a l e must be determined by the circumstances of each case . 
Sqro, 287 U.S. at 210-11 (1932). 
The passage of time, alone, i s not the so l e factor to 
cons ider , Davidson, 458 A.2d at 880, and s t a l e n e s s quest ions can 
not be resolved by the mere counting of days between an event and 
the subsequent issuance of a warrant. 
Common sense demands that the Court a l s o 
consider such fac tors as the nature of 
the crime under i n v e s t i g a t i o n , the dura-
t ion of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n , the type of 
evidence which i s sought and the l o c a t i o n 
of the search in determining whether 
probable cause has evaporated. 
Davidson v. S t a t e , 458 A.2d 875, 880 (Md. App. 1983) . See a l so 
United S ta te s v . Foster , 711 F.2d 871 , 878 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The 
passage of time i s not neces sar i ly a contro l l ing factor in 
determining the ex i s tence of probable cause. The court should 
a l so evaluate the nature of the criminal a c t i v i t y and the kind of 
property for which authorizat ion to search i s sought") . 
The business of dealing in i l l e g a l drugs i s ordinari ly 
a regenerating a c t i v i t y carried on over a period of time, 
Davidson . 458 A.2d at 880, and probable cause may continue for 
several weeks, i f not months, of the l a s t reported instance of 
suspected a c t i v i t y . United S ta te s v . Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 
1394 f 1399 (9th Cir . 1986) . 
Thererore, a warrant authorizing a search for 
control led substances may be properly issued several days after 
an informant observes the i l l e g a l drugs. United State v . Angulo-
Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir . 1986) (approximately 24 days); 
Davidson v. S t a t e . 458 A.2d 875 (Md. App. 1983) (19 days); Zaner 
v. S t a t e , 444 So . 2d 508 (Fla. App. 1984) (14 days) ; Gi les v. 
S t a t e , 149 Ga. App. 263, 254 S.E.2d 154 (1979) (marijuana 
observed within l a s t 5 days) ; People v. Hal l iday, 73 111. App.3d 
615, 392 N.E.2d 389 (1979) (4 days); S ta te v . Blaurock, 143 N.J. 
Super 476, 363 A.2d 909 (1976) (18 days) . 
In State v . Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983) , t h i s 
Court found that a search warrant for marijuana was not s t a l e , 
although the a f f idav i t f a i l e d t o s t a t e the date when the 
informant observed contraband at defendant's res idence . 
Notwithstanding the fact that the magistrate had no knowledge of 
how remote the information was, t h i s Court held that "the 
a f f i d a v i t in the instant case , couched as i t i s in present-tense 
language which described on-going criminal a c t i v i t y , c l ear ly 
refutes any contention that i t was based upon s t a l e information." 
Anderton, 668 P.2d at 1261 ( c i t a t i o n s omitted) . 
In the case at bar, paragraph (8) of the a f f i d a v i t 
s t a t e s the materia ls "are being held in v i o l a t i o n . . •" and 
paragraph (6) s t a t e s , "the informant • • . saw . . • [while at 
defendant's res idence] a large quantity of marijuana which was 
being so ld in smaller q u a n t i t i e s " (Addendum A) . The information 
in the a f f i d a v i t that the informant observed a large quantity of 
marijuana being so ld in smaller q u a n t i t i e s , would lead a 
magistrate to conclude that marijuana would l i k e l y be found at 
the s ta ted l o c a t i o n f i v e days af ter the informant's observat ion. 
To support h i s s t a l e n e s s argument, defendant c i t e s 
several cases , which are d i s t ingu i shable on t h e i r f a c t s . In 
Ashley v. S t a t e . 241 N.E.2d 264 (Ind. 1968) , the court held that 
a search warrant was de fec t ive where there was an e ight day delay 
from the informant's observation t o the execut ion of the search 
warrant; however, unlike the a f f i d a v i t in the case at bar, the 
a f f i d a v i t in Ashley did not address the quantity of marijuana 
observed in defendant's res idence . Further, there was no 
information implicat ing defendant, or anyone l i v i n g at 
defendant's res idence , with prior drug-related criminal a c t i v i t y . 
In the case at bar, paragraph 7 of the a f f idav i t s t a t e s that Dale 
Hundley, defendant's roommate, has been arrested for contro l l ed 
substance v i o l a t i o n s . 
In People v . Wright, 367 Mich. 611 , 116 N.W.2d 786 
(1962) , the a f f i d a v i t f a i l e d t o include information concerning 
the quantity of l iquor observed, and no evidence e x i s t e d of a 
protracted pract ice of s e l l i n g l i q u o r . Similar reasons were 
given by the courts in People v . David, 119 Mich. App. 289, 326 
N.W.2d 485 (1982) and People v. Siemieniec , 368 Mich. 405, 118 
N.W.2d 430 (1962), for not f inding va l id search warrants. Since 
the a f f i d a v i t in the case at bar c l ear ly s tated that the 
informant had provided r e l i a b l e information in the past , the 
informant observed a large quantity of marijuana being sold in 
small port ions , and one of the occupants of the residence had a 
prior arrest record for contro l led substance v i o l a t i o n s , the 
magistrate had probable cause to be l i eve that marijuana would be 
found at the apartment f i ve days after the informant's 
observat ion. 
Defendant's f ina l contention i s that the a f f i d a v i t 
f a i l e d t o ind ica te whether defendant was present or had any 
control over the marijuana at the time of the informant's 
observat ion. Because defendant f a i l s to g ive any l e g a l a n a l y s i s 
or authority to support h i s argument, t h i s Court need not 
address t h i s i s s u e . State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 
1984) . Such information, though, i s not necessary to issue a 
search warrant to search and s e i z e evidence at a designated 
l o c a t i o n . Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-1 (1982)provides: 
A search warrant i s an order issued by a 
magistrate in the name of the s t a t e and 
directed t o a peace o f f i c e r , describing 
with p a r t i c u l a r i t y the thing, place or 
person to be searched and the property 
or evidence to be se ized by him and 
brought before the magistrate . 
The a f f i d a v i t in the instant case was directed t o a place , not a 
person, to be searched. As such, the a f f idav i t s u f f i c i e n t l y 
described the place to be searched and the evidence to be se i zed . 
See a l so State v. Anderson , 10\ P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985) and Utah 
Code Ann. S 77-23-3 (1982) which do not require that the 
defendant's name be t i e d in with the crime. 
In Hopkins v . Commonwealth, 484 S.W. 2d 863 (Ky. 1972) , 
the appellant contended that the a f f i d a v i t f a i l e d to s t a t e that 
he was in possess ion of contraband at the premises named in the 
search warrant. The court found that the a f f i d a v i t was 
s u f f i c i e n t i f i t described the l o c a t i o n (residence) where the 
contraband was observed, i . e . , ownership of the contraband was 
not necessary information in f inding probable cause. Clearly , 
the f a c t that a large amount of marijuana was being sold in small 
q u a n t i t i e s a t 1097 North 15 West in Orem, was s u f f i c i e n t 
information to presume that the marijuana would be located at the 
same premises f i v e days l a t e r in l i e u of information concerning 
the ownership of the marijuana. S imi lar ly , "a search warrant 
otherwise s u f f i c i e n t i s not rendered inva l id by the omission of 
the name of the owner or occupant of the premises to be 
searched." Hanger v . United S t a t e s , 398 F.2d 9 1 , 99 (8th Cir. 
1968) , c e r t , denied, 393 U.S. 1119, rjeh. denied, 395 U.S. 971 
(1969) . 
B. THE AFFIDAVIT CONTAINED SUFFICIENT INDICIA 
OF RELIABILITY FOR THE MAGISTRATE TO FIND 
PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED. 
Defendant contends the a f f i d a v i t in the instant case i s 
i n s u f f i c i e n t because: (1) the information supplied by the 
informant i s vague and (2) no f a c t s e x i s t t o e s t a b l i s h the 
i n f o r m a n t s r e l i a b i l i t y . S p e c i f i c a l l y , defendant argues the 
a f f idav i t should have s ta ted the approximate amount of marijuana 
observed, the persons who may have been present , and whether the 
a f f iant observed an actual s a l e . 
Defendant r e l i e s upon the two prong t e s t e s tab l i shed in 
Aqpjlar y t Texjtg, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and S p i n e l l i v. United 
S t a t e s . 393 U.S. 410 (1969) which requires, f i r s t , that the 
informant have some bas i s of knowledge for h i s statements; and 
second, that the informant i s credible or the information i s 
r e l i a b l e . The Agui lar -Sp ine l l i t e s t was abandoned by the United 
S ta tes Supreme Court in I l l i n o i s v . Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) 
and Massachusetts v. Upton. 466 U.S. 727 (1984) and replaced with 
a " t o t a l i t y of circumstances" standard. This Court a l so adopted 
the standard in Gates and Upton in S ta te v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 
1099 (Utah 1985) and State v . Bai ley , 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984) . 
In Ba i l ey , t h i s Court s tated that even under the Gates t e s t , i t 
might be necessary t o comply with the Aguilar— Spine 11 i two-
pronged t e s t t o e s t a b l i s h the necessary "fair probabi l i ty" that 
the evidence sought could be found at the l oca t ion claimed by the 
informant. However, "if the circumstances as a whole ind icate 
that the informant's report i s t r u t h f u l , " Ba i l ey , 675 P.2d at 
1205-06, then "a l e s s strong showing of the bas i s of a f f i a n t 1 s 
knowledge, veraci ty and r e l i a b i l i t y may be required." I J . See 
a l so S ta te v. Espinoza, 1 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 , P.2d 
(August 4 , 1986) . 
The task of the i s su ing magistrate i s simply 
t o make a p r a c t i c a l , common-sense dec i s ion 
whether, given a l l the circumstances s e t 
forth in the a f f idav i t before him, including 
the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of 
persons supplying hearsay information, there 
1
 In Espinoza, t h i s court did not c i t e to the s l i g h t modification 
in Bai ley , but instead r e l i e d upon the t o t a l i t y of circumstances 
t e s t adopted by t h i s Court in Anderson. 
i s a f a i r probabi l i ty tha t contraband or 
evidence of a crime wi l l be found in a 
pa r t i cu la r place* 
Anderson. 701 P.2d a t 1101, note 8, c i t i ng Gates, 462 U.S. at 
238. 
In the case a t bar, the a f f idavi t viewed in i t s 
e n t i r e t y and in a common sense fashion se t forth su f f i c ien t fac t s 
to support the c r e d i b i l i t y of the informant and the information 
provided by the informant. 
F i r s t , while v i s i t i n g d e f e n d a n t s apartment, the 
informant saw a l a rge quanti ty of marijuana which was being sold 
in smaller q u a n t i t i e s (! 16 of the a f f i d a v i t ) . Second, the 
informant had supplied information t o the aff iant in the past 
which had resul ted in several felony a r r e s t s and convictions (H 5 
of the a f f i d a v i t ) . F ina l ly , Dale Hundley, defendant 's roommate 
had been previously arres ted for v io l a t ions of the Utah 
Controlled Substance Act (H 7 of the a f f i d a v i t ) . 
Defendant complains t h a t the information in the 
a f f idavi t i s vague. However, de ta i led descr ip t ion of criminal 
a c t i v i t y i s only necessary when the informant 's means of 
knowledge i s not s t a t e d . Tomblin v. S t a t e , 128 Ga. App. 823, 
825, 198 S.E. 2d 366, 368 (1973); S p i n e l l i v. United S t a t e s , 393 
U.S. 410, 416 (1969). See also People v. Hal l idav, 73 111. App. 
3d 615, 392 N.E. 2d 389 (1979); S ta te v. Weinberg, 364 So. 2d 964 
(La. 1978). Therefore, since the informant in the case at bar 
"v i s i t ed the residence of Dale Hundley11 and personally observed 
"a l a rge quant i ty of marijuana which was being sold in small 
q u a n t i t i e s , " the informant 's bas is of knowledge was suf f ic ien t ly 
se t fo r th . Moreover, to s t a t e further d e t a i l s in the af f idavi t 
would have risked exposure of the informant 's i den t i ty without a 
measurable increase in relevant information to aid the 
magistrate. Davidson v. S t a t e . 458 A.2d 875, 880 (Md. App. 
1 9 8 3 ) . 
Final ly , defendant contends t ha t the af f idavi t fa i led 
to su f f i c ien t ly describe the informant 's r e l i a b i l i t y . In State 
v, Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 719, n.5 (Utah 1983), t h i s Court upheld 
a search warrant even though " I t l he aff idavi t did not expressly 
aver tha t the informant was credible or h is information 
r e l i a b l e ! . ] " Other courts have not required much de ta i l in an 
af f idavi t concerning an informant 's r e l i a b i l i t y . See e.cj . , State 
v. Horwedel, 674 P.2d 623 (Or. App. 1984) ( i t i s not necessary 
tha t an aff iant describe the informant 's f ami l i a r i ty with the 
speci f ic drug a t i s s u e ) ; S ta te v. Weinberg. 364 So.2d 964 (La. 
1918)(a confidential informant who had supplied information in 
the past which led t o a r r e s t s supported an informant 's 
r e l i a b i l i t y " ) ; Clyat t v. S ta t e , 126 Ga. App. 779, 192 S.E. 2d 417 
(1972) (f t lhe informant 's r e l i a b i l i t y was es tabl ished by the 
a f f i a n t ' s statement tha t the confidential informant had given him 
r e l i a b l e information in the l a s t 90 days); Grant v. S t a t e , 130 
Ga. App. 237, 202 S.E. 2d 675 (1973) ( " t t lhe h is tory of dealing 
with the informant was a su f f i c i en t reason to show the l a t t e r ' s 
r e l i a b i l i t y " ) . Thus, the a f f i a n t ' s statement tha t the informant, 
in the pas t , had given information to the aff iant which resu l ted 
in several felony a r r e s t s and convictions i s in harmony with the 
standards set for th for determining an informant 's r e l i a b i l i t y 
and ve rac i ty . 
Furthermore, even i f t h i s Court f inds the information 
in the a f f idav i t unre l iab le and the subsequent warrant i n v a l i d , 
the evidence should not be suppressed as the r e s u l t of an 
unlawful search and se izure unless the court f inds a subs tant ia l 
v i o l a t i o n and that the search and se i zure was not committed in 
good f a i t h . Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-12 (g) (1) (1982) .2 £ee also 
S ta te v . Babbell» no, 21033, Respondent's Brief Point IB for a 
complete d i scuss ion of t h i s i s s u e . Point IB of the Respondent's 
Babbell Brief i s attached as Addendum C of t h i s br ie f . 
POINT XI 
THE SEARCH OF THE LOCKED METAL BOX WAS WITHIN 
THE SCOPE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT. 
Defendant contends that any search of the locked metal 
box would require a separate showing of probable cause and a 
separate search warrant notwithstanding the or ig ina l search 
warrant. This Court has s tated t h a t : 
l e g a l searches must not be vulnerable to 
being thwarted simply by the expedient of 
concealment in unusual l o c a t i o n s . Rather, 
the l i m i t a t i o n on the scope of a search 
pursuant t o a warrant i s drawn in terms 
of those areas where i t i s reasonable to 
be l i eve that the l i s t e d evidence could be 
l o c a t e d . 
2
 Sect ion 77-35-12(g)(1) provides : 
In any motion concerning the a d m i s s i b i l i t y 
of evidence or the suppression of evidence 
pursuant t o t h i s s ec t i on or at t r i a l , upon 
grounds of unlawful search and s e i z u r e , 
the suppression of evidence shal l not be 
granted unless the court f inds the v i o l a -
t ion upon which i t i s based to be both a 
substant ia l v i o l a t i o n and not committed in 
good f a i t h . The court sha l l s e t forth i t s 
reasons for such f ind ing . 
State v . Romero, 660 P.2d 715 f 718 (Utah 1983) c i t i n g United 
S ta te s v. Chadwell, 427 F.Supp. 692 , 696 ( D. Del . 1977) . In 
Romero, the defendant argued the search was unreasonable because 
the po l ice searched the bedroom, garage, v e h i c l e s , and grounds; 
p laces where the defendant claims business papers l i s t e d in the 
warrant were unl ikely to be found. 
This case i s s imilar to pnited S ta te s v . Gomez-Soto, 
723 F.2d 649 (9th Cir . 1984) c e r t , denied, 466 U.S. 977 (1984), 
which involved the search of a locked briefcase found in 
defendant's home. There, the court found that : 
[ t lhe briefcase would be a l o g i c a l container 
for any of the many things s p e c i f i c a l l y 
described in the warrant . . . . The f a i l u r e 
of the warrant t o a n t i c i p a t e the precise con-
tainer in which the material sought might be 
found i s not f a t a l . 
Id. at 655. The court further s ta ted: 
[ i l t i s axiomatic that i f a warrant s u f f i -
c i e n t l y descr ibes the premises t o be 
searched, t h i s w i l l j u s t i f y a search of the 
personal e f f e c t s therein belonging t o the 
person occupying the premises i f those ef-
f e c t s might contain the items described in 
the warrant. 
I d . at 654, c i t i n g United S ta te s v . Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 
(1982) . 
In United S t a t e s v . Morris, 647 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 
1981) , defendant urged the court to suppress money, introduced 
in to evidence, which was taken from a jewelry box* Defendant 
claimed that h i s expectat ion of privacy in the jewelry box was 
independent of h i s expectat ion of privacy in h i s home. The court 
s t a t e d : 
"To fol low appe l lant ' s l o g i c would require 
e i ther that an addit ional search warrant 
be obtained for each container within a 
larger container . . . or that the agent 
seeking the warrant possess extrasensory 
perception so that he could descr ibe , 
prior to entering the house, the s p e c i f i c 
boxes, s u i t c a s e s , so fas , c l o s e t s , e t c . , 
that he ant ic ipated searching. Obviously 
neither a l t e r n a t i v e i s reasonable or re -
quired. " 
i £ . at 573. 
In the case at bar, a locked box would be a l i k e l y 
place t o hide contraband. Furthermore, at t r i a l , Officer 
Edwards, who has been involved in previous cases dealing with 
marijuana, picked up the metal box, smelled i t , and t e s t i f i e d 
that he thought he detected the odor of marijuana (R. 7 9 -90 ) . 
The o f f i c e r then asked Dale Hundley for a key to open the box (R. 
8 0 ) . Hundley claimed that he did not have one. Xd. Officer 
Edwards then found a key connected t o Hundley's b e l t , which the 
o f f i cer used t o open the lock on the box. Immediately 
therea f t er , the o f f i cer observed and se ized the incriminating 
evidence. Based upon these uncontroverted f a c t s , Officer Edwards 
c l e a r l y had reason to be l i eve that the l i s t e d evidence could be 
located in the locked metal box. 
Defendant's re l iance on United S ta te s v . Chadwickt 433 
U.S. 1 (1977) and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), i s 
misplaced. Both cases involved warrantless searches of motor 
v e h i c l e s and locked containers found within the v e h i c l e s . 
Several courts have d i s t inguished Chadwick and Sanders from cases 
involv ing search warrants. In Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 654, the 
court noted: 
The cases involving locked luggage in auto-
mobiles are not in point , for those a l l deal 
with unwarranted searches of automobiles 
which have been allowed under except ional 
circumstances. 
I £ . at 654 . S imi lar ly , in Ross, 456 U.S. at 798, the United 
S t a t e s Supreme Court s ta ted : 
A lawful search of f ixed premises general ly 
extends t o the e n t i r e area in which the ob-
jec t of the search may be found and i s not 
l imited by the p o s s i b i l i t y that separate 
acts of entry or opening may be required t o 
complete the search. Thus, a warrant that 
authorizes an o f f i cer to search a home for 
i l l e g a l weapons also provides authority t o 
open c l o s e t s , ches t s , drawers, and containers 
in which the weapon might be found. 
I d . at 820-21 . 3 
An orf icer should not be required t o foresee and 
s u f f i c i e n t l y describe in a search warrant every potent ia l 
container where evidence might be found in a res idence, nor 
should the o f f i cer be required to obtain addit ional search 
warrants t o search those areas as long as the containers could 
reasonably contain the items searched for and the containers are 
found within the area described in the search warrant. Since the 
metal container in the case at bar was found in the premises 
i d e n t i f i e d in the search warrant, and since the container was a 
l i k e l y place to s tore marijuana, the rul ing of the t r i a l court 
should be affirmed. 
3 Chadwick and Sanders are thoroughly reviewed in Ross which held 
that i f probable cause e x i s t e d to search a v e h i c l e , the po l i ce 
could, without a warrant, search the en t i re v e h i c l e , including 
c losed conta iners . Sanders was thus p a r t i a l l y overruled. 
CONCISION 
Based upon the foregoing f the S ta te requests t h i s court 
t o affirm the t r i a l court and t o f ind the evidence was obtained 
in good f a i t h , pursuant t o v a l i d search warrant, 
DATED t h i s ? 7 day of October, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
KIMBERLY £ . HORNAK 
Ass i s tant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM A 
OXBOVXT OODIT, OtIM DBrABTHBBT 
UTAI COOITT, STATE OF UTAI 
STATE OF UTAH, 
-VS-
DALE HUNDLEY 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
PIOBABLI CAUSE AFFIDAVIT 
II 8DPP01T OF AID MOTIOI 
FOE A SEABCH VABEAIT 
Case No. 
t SS. 
) 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
1. J. Peter Hansen, being first duly ivorn on oath, 
deposes and aayst 
2. That I aa a police officer for the Oreo Department 
of Public Safety, Ores, Utah County, State of Utah. 
3. That Dale J. Hundley lives at the address 1097 
North 150 West Orem, Utah County, Utah. 
4. That your affiant describes the address at 1097 
North 150 West as an east-facing brown brick four-plex with the 
nuabera 1097 on the door of the upper floor north apartment in 
Orea, Utah County, Utah. 
5. That your affiant has had contact with a confiden-
tial informant who has supplied your affiant with information in 
eh* past which has resulted in several felony arrests and 
convictions. 
6. That your affiant was told by this informant that on 
August 11, 1985 the informant visited the residence of Dale 
Hundl«y and while there saw a large quantity of marijuana which 
7. That your affiant ia faailiar with Dale Hundley ae 
le baa been arretted by officers of the Orea Departaent of Public 
aftty for controlled tubttance violations. 
0. Thtt the atttrialt tought by thit application for 
tarch and teizure warrant are being held in violation of the 
tah Controlled Subtttnct Act and of the Utah Code Annotated and 
re evidence of feloniout drug criaet. 
J. Peter Htnten 
AFFIANT 
jbtcribed and sworn to before ae this day of August, 1985, 
t hrs. 
CIRCUIT COURT MAGISTRATE 
ADDENDUM B 
MJ7-S. Prohibited acta—Penalties—(D Prohibited acta A—Penal-
tits 
(a) Except as authorised by this act, it shall be unlawful for any 
person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) To produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent 
to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) To distribute for value or possess with intent to distribute for 
value a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) To possess a controlled substance enumerated in section 68-
37-4 in the course of his business as a sales representative of a manu-
facturer or distributor of substances enumerated in schedules II through 
V of section 58-37-4 except pursuant to an order or prescrition; 
(iv) To agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute or dispense a 
controlled substsnee for value or to negotiate to have a controlled sub-
stance distributed or dispensed for value and distribute, dispense, or 
negotiate the distribution or dispensing of any other liquid, substance, 
or material in lieu of the specific controlled substance so offered, agreed, 
consented, arranged, or negotiated. 
ADDENDUM C 
between the promotion of l eg i t imate governmental i n t e r e s t s and 
the i n d i v i d u a l ' s i n t e r e s t in being f ree from intrus ions on 
fundamental cons t i tu t iona l r igh t s . Gates# 462 U.S. at 239. See 
a l s o I l l i n o i s v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 644 (1983); American 
Pork Citv v. Crosarove, 701 P.2d 1069, 1073-75 (Utah 1985) 
(p lura l i ty opinion) . 
The State i s aware that several of t h i s Court fs recent 
opinions have suggested that f as has been done in some other 
s t a t e s with the ir c o n s t i t u t i o n s 1 search-and-seizure provis ions , 
a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 14 could be construed t o expand c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
protect ion beyond that mandated by the United Sta tes Supreme 
Court under the fourth amendment. S ta te v. Earl , 716 P.2d 803, 
805-06 (Utah 1986); State v. Hyqh. 711 P.2d 264, 271-73 (Utah 
1985) (Zimmerman, J . , concurring s epara te ly ) . As an i n i t i a l 
matter, there i s nothing in e i ther the text of the s t a t e 
provision (which i s nearly i d e n t i c a l t o the fourth amendment) or 
the h i s tory of i t s adoption5 that suggests that the framers of 
5 The State has been able to find only a brief reference to 
a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 14 at the Const i tut ional Convention of 19 85. 
The fol lowing appears t o be the ent i re record of any proceedings 
in that regard: 
The Chairman: Gentlemen, we w i l l take up 
sec t ion 14, 
Sect ion 14 was read and passed 
without amendment. 
1 Of f i c ia l Report of Proceedings and Debates of the Convention: 
1895 319 (1898) . 
The development of Utah fs search-and-seizure provis ion prior 
t o the adoption of a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 14 r e f l e c t s a steady 
movement by the drafters toward adoption of the precise wording 
of the fourth amendment (see Appendix B). 
- n -
the Utah Const i tut ion intended that i t be given an in terpre ta t ion 
d i f f erent from that given the fourth amendment* However, the 
State recognizes that the current Court may s t i l l g ive the s t a t e 
provis ion an independent and more pro tec t ive in terpre ta t ion in 
future c a s e s , perhaps adopting the fol lowing view taken by the 
Miss i s s ippi Supreme Court in a recent case: 
We accord t o the U.S. Supreme Court the 
utmost respect in i t s in terpre ta t ion of 
the U.S. Const i tut ion . We must, however, 
reserve for t h i s Court the s o l e and abso-
l u t e r ight to make the f ina l in terpretat ion 
of our s t a t e Const i tut ion and, while of 
great persuasion, we w i l l not concede that 
simply because the U.S. Supreme Court may 
in terpret a U.S. Const i tut ional provis ion 
that we must give the same in terpre ta t ion 
t o e s s e n t i a l l y the same words in a pro-
v i s i o n of our s t a t e Cons t i tu t ion . 
Penick v . S t a t e , 440 So.2d 547, 551 (Miss. 1983) . See a lso State 
v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, n. 1 , 716 P.2d 1288, 1292 n. 1 
(1986); S ta te v . Arrinoton, 311 N.C. 633 , 642-43 , 319 S.E.2d 254, 
260 (1981). Neverthe less , the State urges the Court not t o l o s e 
s ight of i t s h i s tory of construing a r t i c l e I , s ec t i on 14 as 
providing the same scope of protect ion as the fourth amendment, 
and the philosophy underlying that h i s t o r y . See, e . g . , State v . 
J a s s o , 21 Utah 2d 24 , 439 P.2d 844 (1968); S ta te v. Cr i sco la , 21 
Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968); State v . Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 
(Utah 1976) . It should proceed very caut ious ly i n t o t h i s new 
t e r r i t o r y . As the Vermont Supreme Court correct ly s t a t e d : 
The development of s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l j u r i s -
prudence w i l l c a l l for the exerc ise of great 
j u d i c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as wel l as d i l i g e n c e 
from the t r i a l bar. I t would be a ser ious 
mistake for t h i s Court to use i t s s t a t e con-
s t i t u t i o n c h i e f l y to evade the impact of the 
dec i s i ons of the United S ta te s Supreme Court. 
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Our decisions must be pr incipled, not r e s u l t -
or iented. Jus t i ce Pollock of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court expressed h is concern t h i s way: 
M s l t a t e courts should not look to the i r 
cons t i tu t ions only when they wish to reach a 
resu l t d i f ferent trom the United Sta tes Supreme 
Court. That pract ice runs the risk of c r i t i -
cism as being more pragmatic than pr inc ip led ." 
Sta te v. Jewett , 500 A.2d 233, 235-36 (Vt. 1985) (footnote 
c i t a t i o n omitted). A recent opinion from the New Jersey courts 
echoes t h i s concern: 
There are cer ta in dangers inherent in s t a t e 
courts relying too heavily on s t a t e Consti tu-
t i ons to afford greater protect ion to i t s 
c i t i z e n s . The erosion of national cons t i tu -
t iona l doctrine i s one i l l u s t r a t i o n . We are 
therefore mindful of the d e s i r a b i l i t y of 
uniformity between the s t a t e and federal 
courts in the in t e rp re t a t ion of pa ra l l e l 
cons t i tu t iona l provis ions . Divergent i n t e r -
pre ta t ions should be avoided unless guide-
l i n e s such as those discussed in Sta te v. Hunt, 
91 N.J. a t 358-368, 450 A.2d 952, j u s t i fy a 
depar ture . 
Sta te v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. Super. 229, 239-40, 491 A.2d 37, 43 
(1985). In the Hunt case ci ted by the Novembrino court , Ju s t i ce 
Handler in a concurring opinion ident i f ied the following c r i t e r i a 
for deciding whether t o i n t e rp re t the s t a t e cons t i tu t ion 
d i f ferent ly than has the federal cons t i t u t ion : (1) tex tua l 
language; (2) l e g i s l a t i v e h i s to ry ; (3) preexis t ing s t a t e law; (4) 
s t ruc tu ra l d i f ferences; (5) matters of pa r t i cu la r s t a t e i n t e r e s t 
or loca l concern; (6) s t a t e t r a d i t i o n s ; and (7) public a t t i t u d e s . 
This would be a reasonable set of factors for t h i s Court to take 
into account before resor t ing t o independent s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l 
i n t e rp r e t a t i on t o provide protect ions t h a t are e i ther l e s s 
expansive or nonexistent under the federal cons t i tu t ion . 
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I t i s highly s i g n i f i c a n t tha t , even after the issuance 
of the "suggestive" opinions in Earl and flygh* the Court 
continues t o re ly s o l e l y on federal precedent in terpret ing the 
fourth amendment in deciding search-and-seizure i s s u e s , with no 
ind icat ion that those i s sues might be decided d i f f e r e n t l y under 
a r t i c l e I , s ec t i on 14 or that addi t ional br ie f ing on the s t a t e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l quest ion was necessary. See, e . g . . State v . 
Banks. 720 P.2d 1380, 1382-84 (Utah 1986); S tate v. Kel lv , 718 
P.2d 385, 389-92 (Utah 1986) . Cf. State v . N ie l s en , 43 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 13 , 16 , P.2d , (1986) (noting that "what the 
appropriate remedy might be i f Ithe defendant] had argued that 
the o f f i c e r ' s ac t ion v i o l a t e d h i s r ights under a r t i c l e I , s ec t i on 
14 of the Utah Const i tut ion i s an open ques t i on") . This i s not 
to say that the federal precedents in t h i s area must neces sar i ly 
represent the most s a t i s f a c t o r y reso lut ion of the i s s u e s in a l l 
in s tances , or that a l t e r n a t i v e approaches to search and se izure 
law should never be considered. See Bradley, "Two Models of the 
Fourth Amendment," 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1468 (1985) . 6 The point i s 
that t h i s Court w i l l often find an acceptable reso lu t ion of a 
search or se izure problem in the federal case law (on both 
6
 Professor Bradley, in an e x c e l l e n t a r t i c l e , d i scusses two 
a l t e r n a t i v e models for c l a r i f i c a t i o n of fourth amendment law. He 
argues that adoption of e i ther model would so lve many of the 
problems the Supreme Court has had with search-and-seizure i s s u e s 
and would change a widely held view that "It lhe fourth amendment 
i s the Supreme Court's tarbaby: a mass of contradic t ions and 
o b s c u r i t i e s that has ensnared the 'Brethren1 in such a way that 
every e f for t t o ex trac t themselves only f inds them more 
profoundly s tuck." 83 Mich. L. Rev. at 1468. 
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phi losophicai and publ ic po l icy grounds), as i t apparently did in 
Banks and Kel ly , and therefore have no reason t o interpret 
a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 14 d i f f e r e n t l y . See, e . g . . State v . Ouinn, 50 
Or* App. 383, , 623 P.2d 630, 638-39 (1981) (adopting federal 
p o s i t i o n for purposes of s t a t e cons t i tu t ion on search-and-seizure 
i s s u e ) ; S tate v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 752, 653 P.2d 942, 948 
(1982) ( c i t i n g cases where the s t a t e court recognized the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of expanding protect ion under the s ta t e cons t i tu t ion 
beyond that required under the federal c o n s t i t u t i o n , but decl ined 
t o take such a s tep in the given c a s e ) . 
Theretore, when the federal case law provides a wel l 
reasoned reso lut ion of the i s s u e , the State i s not inc l ined t o 
become immersed in a lengthy d iscuss ion about whether, as a 
general p r i n c i p l e , a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 14 could be interpreted 
d i f f e r e n t l y than has the fourth amendment. Rather, the State 
w i l l indicate that the part icular i s sue should not be decided 
d i f f e r e n t l y on s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l grounds and re ly on the 
rat iona le for the pos i t ion provided in the federal precedent and 
s t a t e dec i s ions that have followed i t . £ £ . Andrews v. Morris, 
677 P.2d 81 , 88-95 (Utah 1983) (re ly ing heavi ly on federal 
precedent in formulating s t a t e r e t r o a c t i v i t y doc tr ine ) ; Vali 
Convalescent & Care I n s t i t u t i o n v. Industr ia l Commission# 649 
P.2d 3 3 , 35 (Utah 1982) ("This Court has held that dec i s ions 
r e l a t i n g t o the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
S ta te s Const i tut ion are highly persuasive when interpet ing the 
due process clause of the Utah Const i tut ion.") . No violence i s 
done t o the s ta te cons t i tu t ion by "marching lock-s tep" with the 
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federal pos i t ion , State v. Bishop. 717 P.2d 261 r 272 (Utah 1986) 
(Durham, J . , concurr ing) , i £ tha t pos i t ion r e f l e c t s the most 
i n t e l l i g e n t ana lys is of the pa r t i cu la r problem. See, e .g . # 
Crosqrove, 701 P.2d a t 1071-75 (reversing an e a r l i e r decision 
that gave the se l f - incr iminat ion clause of UTAH CONST, a r t . I , S 
182 a d i f ferent i n t e rp re t a t i on than that given the pa ra l l e l but 
d i f f e ren t ly worded provision in U.S. CONST* amend. V). The S ta te 
has not taken the pos i t ion tha t the Court should never r e j ec t 
federal precedent and decide a search or seizure issue on 
independent s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l grounds; r a the r , i t has 
cons is ten t ly recognized t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y in recent b r i e f s t o t h i s 
Court. E.g. S ta te v. Mendoza, Case No. 20922, Brief of Appellant 
a t 17-18, Reply Brief of Appellant a t 3-6 (case pending); S ta te 
v. Schlosser, Case No. 860061, Brief of Appellant a t 5-6 (case 
pending); S ta te v. Watts, Case No. 860092, Brief of Respondent a t 
10 (case pending). If presented with appropriate fac ts in a 
p a r t i c u l a r case, the S ta te w i l l provide the Court with a fu l l 
ana lys i s of why i t bel ieves a r t i c l e I , sect ion 14 should be 
in te rpre ted d i f fe ren t ly than has the fourth amendment. The Sta te 
i s aware of the po ten t ia l advantages of "c lear -cut ru l e s " in t h i s 
area which wi l l guide, rather than befuddle, law enforcement 
o f f ice rs and which wi l l avoid " imperi l l ing] both the r igh t s of 
indiv iduals and the i n t e g r i t y and effect iveness of law 
enforcement." Hygh* 711 P.2d a t 272 (Zimmerman, J . , concurring 
s e p a r a t e l y ) . I t i s also aware of the forceful arguments recent ly 
advanced by a number of legal commentators tha t s t a t e courts 
should more frequently look t o t h e i r s t a t e cons t i tu t ions in 
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resolving cons t i tu t iona l i ssues . See* e.g.* Williams* "In The 
Supreme Court 's Shadow: Legitimacy of Sta te Rejection of Supreme 
Court Reasoning and Result*" 35 S.C.L. Rev. 353 (1984) t Linde* "E 
Pluribus — Const i tut ional Theory and State Courts*" 18 Ga. L. 
Rev. 165 (1984) . Indeed* t h i s subject has received considerable 
a t t en t ion in the legal l i t e r a t u r e from numerous wr i t e r s with 
varying viewpoints on the i s sue . See State v. Brown* 708 S.W.2d 
140* 147 n . 1 (Mo. 1986) (Welliver* J . , concurring in part and 
d issent ing in p a r t ) . 
However* un t i l the Sta te i s convinced t h a t the federal 
search-and-seizure case law (which has t r a d i t i o n a l l y provided the 
basis for Utah's search-and-seizure law) i s not acceptable* i t 
wi l l not h e s i t a t e to continue to c i t e t o t h i s Court federal cases 
as support for i t s pos i t ion . Presumably, the Court has not been 
d i s s a t i s f i e d with the reasoning of the federal precedents i t has 
r e l i ed upon in deciding search-and-seizure i s sues . Furthermore* 
if the pa r t i e s in a case have fa i l ed to brief adequately the 
s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l question and the Court believes t ha t the 
defendant i s afforded greater protect ion under a r t i c l e I , section 
14 than under the fourth amendment* i t seems tha t the Court would 
have an obl igat ion t o request addi t ional b r ie f ing , reach the 
s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l question* and ful ly explain what the greater 
protec t ion i s . Otherwise* the technical error of inadequate 
br ief ing i s permitted to transcend the fundamental cons t i tu t iona l 
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r i g h t s of the c i t i z en ry . See Jewett , 500 A.2d a t 238. 7 
Final ly , although the Court may in some instances be 
j u s t i f i a b l y concerned t ha t "the analys is of s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l 
i ssues in criminal appeals continues to be ignored," Ea r l , 716 
P*2d a t 806, i t should remember tha t i t has decided numerous 
state cons t i tu t iona l quest ions in recent criminal cases . In 
f ac t , the Court has frequently disposed of the question by 
concluding with l i t t l e he s i t a t i on t h a t , e i the r in the given case 
or as a general p r inc ip l e , the s t a t e provision has the same scope 
of protect ion as i t s federal counterpar t . See, e . g . . S ta te v. 
Nelson, 42 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 20, P.2d , (1986) 
(admission of hearsay statements not a v io l a t ion of the r ight to 
confrontation under e i ther U.S. CONST, amend. VI or UTAH CONST, 
a r t . I , S 12) ; S ta te v. Schreuder, 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 46, 52, 
P.2d , (1986) (rule tha t admission of out-of-court 
statements under the circumstances of the case created no 
confrontation problem is same under federal and s t a t e 
' The S ta te maintains the pos i t ion i t took in S ta te v. Mendoza, 
Case No. 20922, Reply Brief of Appellant a t 4 (case pending) 
t h a t , because the resolu t ion of search-and-seizure issues on 
s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l grounds would mark a clear departure from 
past p r ac t i ce , the Court should not address the s t a t e law issue 
without the benefit of br ief ing from the p a r t i e s . £f. S ta te v. 
Bishop, 717 P.2d a t 272 (Durham, J . , concurring) (where Jus t i ce 
Durham suggests t h a t , even in the absence of br ief ing by the 
p a r t i e s , the Court could address an issue under the s t a t e 
cons t i tu t ion sua sponte) . Indeed, the Court should r a r e ly , if 
ever, ra ise and address an issue sua sponte in any criminal 
appeal . Cf. S ta te v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 270 (Utah 1980) (where 
the Court, without asking for addit ional br ief ing from the 
p a r t i e s , dea l t with an in s t ruc t iona l issue in a cap i t a l case tha t 
was not raised by the defendant in the t r i a l court (or on 
appeal ) . A request by the Court for further br ief ing would be 
preferable . 
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c o n s t i t u t i o n ) ; S ta te v Banks, 720 P.2d at 1385 ( interpret ing in 
p a r a l l e l fashion the speedy- tr ia l provisions contained in UTAH 
CONST, ar t . I , S 12 and U.S. CONST, amend. VI); S tate v . Bishop, 
717 P.2d at 265-67 (holding that "the Utah and the federal cruel 
and unusual punishment provis ions apply to t h i s case in the same 
fashion;" and equal protect ion a n a l y s i s same under s t a t e and 
federal c o n s t i t u t i o n s ) ; S tate v . Hygh. 711 P.2d at 267 (holding 
that , as under federal law, inventory searches are permitted by 
UTAH CONST, art . I , S 14); S ta te v . Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1343 
(Utah 1984) (holding that , in the context of the instant c a s e , 
"Artic le I , S 9 [of the Utah Const i tut ion] does not give the 
defendant more extens ive protect ions than those afforded by the 
Eighth Amendment"); S tate v . Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1203-06 (Utah 
1984) ( i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s tance of counsel a n a l y s i s same under UTAH 
CONST, ar t . I , S 12 and U.S. CONST, amend. VI); S ta te v . Norton. 
675 P.2d 577, 585 n. 5 (Utah 1983) , c e r t , denied, 466 U.S. 942 
(1984) ("This Court recognizes no d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
protect ion against ex post f ac to laws provided by the Utah and 
the United S ta te s Const i tut ions") ; McNair v . Hayward, 666 P.2d 
321 , 323 (Utah 1983) (the double jeopardy provis ions of U.S. 
CONST, amend V and of UTAH CONST, ar t . I , S 12 "have the same 
content") . Impl ic i t in these dec i s ions i s that a de ta i l ed 
independent ana lys i s of the s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l provis ions i s in 
many cases unnecessary. Cf. S ta te v. T u t t l e , 713 P.2d 703 (Utah 
1985) ( re jec t ing E s t e l l e v . Dor rough, 420 U.S. 534 (1975) , and 
holding that , under UTAH CONST, a r t . I , S 12, defendant was 
e n t i t l e d t o have h i s appeal re instated af ter having escaped) . 
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Here, defendant advances no compelling arguments in 
support of the proposi t ion tha t a r t i c l e I , sect ion 14 demands 
adoption of the Aoui lar -Spinel l i t e s t and re jec t ion of the Gates 
test* For the reasons s ta ted by the majority in Gates, the 
t o t a l i t y of the circumstances approach to determining the 
sufficiency of an informant-based warrant i s far more reasonable 
and useful "than i s any r ig id demand t h a t spec i f ic ' t e s t s 1 be 
sa t i s f i ed by every informant 's t i p , " 462 U.S. a t 230-31. 
Furthermore, an i nd iv idua l ' s privacy i n t e r e s t s a re not 
compromised when i t i s appl ied. Therefore, if the issue i s 
addressed in the context of t h i s case, the Court should continue 
to follow the Gates-type approach i t employed in Anderson when 
in t e rp re t ing a r t i c l e I , sect ion 14. In fac t , t h i s appears to be 
the precise course the Court has chosen to follow. See S ta te v. 
Esoinoza, 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 , 24, P.2d , (1986) . Cf. 
People v. Panne baker . 714 P.2d 904 (Colo. 1986) (adopting Gates 
t e s t for purposes of s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n ' s search-and-seizure 
p rov i s ion) ; S ta te v. Lana, 105 Idaho 683, 672 P.2d 561 (1983) 
(adopting Gates as s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l ru l e ) ; S ta te v. Jackson, 
688 P.2d 136 (Wash. 1984) ( re jec t ing Gates and re ta in ing Aguilar-
Sp ine l l i t e s t on s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l grounds). 
Based upon the foregoing discussion, the search warrant 
was supported by the probable cause, and therefore the t r i a l 
court was not required to suppress the challenged evidence under 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g) which, as discussed in subsection B, i s 
the cont ro l l ing ru l e for suppression issues concerning an 
a l legedly unlawful search or se izure . 
- 2 2 -
B. Rule 12(g) , Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
As par t of his argument on appeal, defendant contends 
tha t the evidence he challenges should have been excluded under 
Utah R. Crim P. 12(g).^ Although defendant does not challenge 
the appropriateness or cons t i t u t i ona l i t y of Rule 12(g), given 
that t h i s Court has never ful ly discussed the ru le , the Sta te 
wi l l f i r s t examine the current s t a tu s of t h i s modified 
exclusionary rule in Utah's criminal jus t i ce system. The 
question of whether exclusion was required under Rule 12(g) wi l l 
then be addressed. 
8 Rule 12(g) provides: 
(1) In any motion concerning the admiss ib i l i ty of evidence or 
the suppression of evidence pursuant t o t h i s sect ion or a t t r i a l , 
upon grounds of unlawful search and se izure , the suppression of 
evidence shall not be granted unless the court f inds the 
v io la t ion upon which i t i s based t o be both a substant ia l 
v io l a t ion and not committed in good f a i t h . The court shal l se t 
forth i t s reasons for such f inding. 
(2) An unlawful search or seizure shal l in a l l cases be deemed 
subs tan t ia l if one or more of the following i s es tabl ished by the 
defendant or applicant by a preponderance of the evidence: 
(i) The v io la t ion was grossly negl igent , w i l l fu l , malicious, 
shocking to the conscience of the court or was a r e su l t of the 
prac t ice of the law enforcement agency pursuant t o a general 
order of tha t agency; 
( i i ) The v io la t ion was intended only to harass without 
l eg i t imate law enforcement purposes. 
(3) In determining whether a peace officer was act ing in good 
fa i th under t h i s sect ion, the court shal l consider, in addit ion 
to any other relevant fac to rs , some or a l l of the following: 
( i ) The extent of deviation from legal search and seizure 
s tandards ; 
( i i ) The extent t o which exclusion wi l l tend to deter future 
v io l a t i ons of search and seizure standards; 
( i i i ) Whether or not the officer was proceeding by way of a 
search warrant, a r r e s t warrant, or relying on previous speci f ic 
d i r ec t ions of a magistrate or prosecutor; or 
(iv) The extent t o which privacy was invaded. 
(4) If the defendant or applicant es tab l i shes t ha t the search 
or se izure was unlawful and subs tan t ia l by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the peace officer or governmental agency must then, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, prove the good fa i th act ions of 
the peace of f icer . 
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At the outse t , i t i s necessary to summarize the 
l e g i s l a t i v e h is tory of Rule 12(g) and t h i s Court's treatment of 
i t in the case law. In 1982, the l e g i s l a t u r e enacted Rule 12(g) 
as part of the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act (1982 Utah Laws 
ch. 1 0 , SS 1 -16 ) . During the time that Rule 12(g) operated as a 
l e g i s l a t i v e l y enacted rule of criminal procedure, t h i s Court 
never ruled upon i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . See State v . Anderson, 
701 P.2d at 1103. In September 1985, the Court in In Re; Rules 
of Procedure, 18 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1985) , adopted a l l e x i s t i n g 
s tatutory ru les of procedure not i n c o n s i s t e n t with procedural 
ru le s previously adopted by the Court. This administrat ive 
rul ing was made in response t o the amendments t o a r t i c l e VIII , 
s e c t i o n 4 of the Utah Constitution^ which were approved by the 
v o t e r s in November 1984 and became e f f e c t i v e on July 1 , 1985. 
See Compiler's Notes, UTAH CODE ANN. 1953, Replacement Vol . 1A at 
58 (Supp. 1986) . The amendments t o a r t i c l e VIII 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d the Court's rule-making author i ty , which had 
previously only been accorded by s t a t u t e . See UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-2-4 (1977) (amended 1986); 1943 Utah Laws ch. 3 3 , § 1 (which 
gave the Court rule-making power in a l l c i v i l a c t i o n s ) . Since 
rece iv ing f u l l rule-making power in 1943, the Court apparently 
5 A r t i c l e VIII , s ec t ion 4 now provides in pert inent part: 
The supreme court sha l l adopt ru le s of procedure 
and evidence to be used in the courts of the s t a t e 
and shal l by ru le manage the appel late process . The 
l e g i s l a t u r e may amend the rules of procedure and 
evidence adopted by the supreme court upon a vote of 
two-thirds of a l l members of both houses of the 
l e g i s l a t u r e . . . . 
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has never independently devised and adopted ru les of criminal 
procedure; the l e g i s l a t u r e has h i s t o r i c a l l y performed t h i s task. 
See UTAH CODE ANN. S 105-1-1 fit fififl. (1943); UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-
1-1 fit fifig. (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-1-1 fit ££3* (1978); UTAH 
CODE ANN. S 77-35-1 fit figfl. ( 1 9 8 2 ) . 1 0 This has not been the case 
with the ru le s of c i v i l procedure or the ru le s of evidence. See 
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1332-33 (Utah 1986); Brickyard 
Homeowners' Ass 'n . v. Gibbons Realty: 668 P.2d 535, 539 (Utah 
1983) . In Re; Rules of Procedure marks the f i r s t time that the 
Court has independently adopted rules of criminal procedure; and 
i t did so through an apparent wholesale adoption of the 
l e g i s l a t i v e l y enacted rules contained in UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-1 
fit seq . (1982). There being no previously Court-adopted rules of 
criminal procedure, the l e g i s l a t u r e ^ ru les presumably are now 
the Court's ru les—unqual i f i ed . Therefore, the State i s 
proceeding on the assumption that Rule 12(g) i s in place as a 
rule of criminal procedure formally adopted by t h i s Court, and 
that i t i s the contro l l ing rule for a l l motions t o suppress 
evidence for an a l l eged ly unlawful search or s e i z u r e . See State 
v . Hygh # 711 P.2d at 273 (Zimmerman, J . , concurring separately) 
("I have found no case in which t h i s Court has decided t o adopt 
the exclusionary rule after independently analyzing the quest ion 
of what remedy i s ava i lab le for an unlawful search or seizure 
1 0
 In 1980, the l e g i s l a t u r e , for the f i r s t t ime, s p e c i f i c a l l y 
designated the ru le s of criminal procedure and s e t than apart in 
chapter 35 of t i t l e 77 . 
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under our s t a t e const i tut ion") . H 
Having said t h i s , two i s s u e s require t h i s Court's 
cons iderat ion: (1) To what extent i s the t rad i t i ona l 
exclusionary rule required under the federal c o n s t i t u t i o n or the 
s t a t e cons t i tu t ion? (2) I s Rule 1 2 ( g ) , the Court's ru l e , a 
permiss ible remedy for a v i o l a t i o n of the accused9 s r ights under 
the fourth amendment and a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 14? These i s s u e s are 
raised by the State because t h i s Court has never f u l l y discussed 
i t s r a t i o n a l e for applying an exclusionary rule for unlawful 
searches and se i zures in cases prior t o i t s adoption of Rule 
1 2 ( g ) , or d i sc losed i t s ra t iona le for adopting Rule 1 2 ( g ) , which 
represents a clear departure from the exclusionary rule the Court 
has t r a d i t i o n a l l y applied. The State simply o f f ers the fo l lowing 
a n a l y s i s as support for the Court1 s adoption of Rule 1 2 ( g ) . 
The S t a t e ' s approach to these i s s u e s w i l l not be an 
or ig ina l one. Four helpful law review a r t i c l e s on the 
exclusionary rule w i l l be r e l i e d upon in developing the 
d i scuss ion that fol lows—Coe, "The ALI S u b s t a n t i a l i t y Tes t : A 
F lex ib l e Approach to the Exclusionary Sanction," 10 Ga. L. Rev. 1 
(1975); Kaplan, "The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule," 26 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1027 (1974); Schroeder, "Deterring Fourth Amendment 
V i o l a t i o n s : Al ternat ives to the Exclusionary Rule," 69 Geo. L.J. 
1361 (1981); and Stewart, "The Road t o Mapp v . Ohio and Beyond: 
The Origins , Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in 
Search-and-Seizure Cases," 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365 (1983) . The 
11 Just ice Zimmerman's concurrence was issued prior to the 
issuance of In Re: Rules of Procedure. 
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focus here w i l l be s l i g h t l y d i f ferent from that in other b r i e f s 
on the subject recent ly f i l e d by the S ta te in State v. Mendoza, 
Case Mo. 20922, a case currently pending before the Court. 
Although the Mendoza br i e f s provide a good s tar t ing point for a 
d i scuss ion of Rule 1 2 ( g ) , they do not address pertinent quest ions 
regarding the necess i ty of an exclusionary rule under our s ta te 
c o n s t i t u t i o n . Accordingly, the State urges the Court to consider 
the S t a t e ' s arguments in Mendoza in l i g h t of the d iscuss ion of 
Rule 12(g) presented here . 
Three Supreme Court cases are general ly credited with 
producing the exclusionary rule—Boyd v. United S t a t e s , 116 U.S. 
616 (1886); Adams v . New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904); Weeks v . 
United S t a t e s , 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The f a i r l y narrow rule that 
emerged from that t r i l o g y of cases was s i g n i f i c a n t l y broadened in 
subsequent cases , culminating in Agnello v. United S t a t e s , 269 
U.S. 20 (1925) , which held that contraband se i zed in v i o l a t i o n of 
the fourth amendment could not be used as evidence in a federal 
criminal t r i a l . However, none of the Court's opinions c l ear ly 
i d e n t i f i e d the doctrinal bas i s for the exclusionary ru le . Then 
in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) , the Court made clear 
that the securi ty of one f s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by 
the pol ice i s " impl ic i t in the concept of ordered l i b e r t y , " and 
therefore enforceable against the s t a t e s through the due process 
c lause of the fourteenth amendment. Although i t for the f i r s t 
time e x p l i c i t l y treated the quest ion of the exc lus ion of 
i l l e g a l l y se ized evidence as a matter of remedies, apart from the 
right secured by the fourth amendment, the Court in Wolf refused 
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t o impose the f edera l ly fashioned exclusionary rule on the s t a t e s 
as the part icular remedy for uncons t i tu t iona l ly se ized evidence. 
The Wolf majority recognized that other "equally e f f e c t i v e " s t a t e 
methods for deterring unreasonable searches and se i zures would 
s u f f i c e . 338 U.S. at 3 1 . 
However, in 1961 the Court in Mapp v . Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961), overruled the pert inent port ions of Wolf and held 
that the exclusionary rule was appl icable to s t a t e criminal 
prosecut ions: 
Today we once again examine Wolf1 s c o n s t i t u -
t iona l documentation of the right to privacy 
from unreasonable s t a t e in trus ion , and, 
af ter i t s dozen years on our books, are l ed 
by it to close the only courtroom door r e -
maining open t o evidence secured by o f f i c i a l 
lawlessness in f lagrant abuse of that basic 
r ight , reserved t o a l l persons as a s p e c i f i c 
guarantee against that very same unlawful 
conduct. We hold that a l l evidence obtained 
by searches and s e i z u r e s in v i o l a t i o n of the 
Const i tut ion i s , by that same author i ty , 
inadmiss ible in a s t a t e court. 
367 U.S. a t 654-55. F ina l ly , in a recent dec i s ion the Court 
c l e a r l y rejected the premise upon which Mapp seemed t o res t— 
i . e . , that the exclusionary ru le was a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y required 
remedy. In United S t a t e s v . Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) , i t 
s t a t e d : 
The Fourth Amendment contains no provis ion 
express ly precluding the use of evidence 
obtained in v i o l a t i o n of i t s commands, and 
an examination of i t s or ig in and purposes 
makes c lear that the use of f r u i t s of a 
past unlawful search or se izure "work Is] no 
new Fourth Amendment wrong." United S t a t e s 
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974). The 
wrong condemned by the Amendment i s "ful ly 
accomplished" by the unlawful search or 
se izure i t s e l f , i b i d . , and the exclusionary 
rule i s ne i ther intended nor able to "cure 
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the invasion of the de fendan t s r i gh t s which 
he has already suffered," Stone v. Powellt 
supra, at 540 (WHITE, J . , d i s sen t ing ) . The 
rule thus operates as *a j ud i c i a l l y created 
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment 
rights generally through its deterrent effeoti 
rather than a personal constitutional right 
of the person aggrieved^ united states v. 
Calandrar supra, a t 348. 
468 U.S. at 906 (emphasis added). Thus, now tha t i t i s s e t t l ed 
tha t the exclusionary ru le i s not required by the federal 
cons t i tu t ion , the immediate question confronting s t a t e appel late 
courts i s whether the ru le i s required by t he i r individual s t a t e 
cons t i t u t i ons . 
As with the fourth amendment, a r t i c l e I , section 14 
contains no provision expressly excluding from a criminal t r i a l 
evidence tha t has been obtained in v io la t ion of i t s commands. 
Prior to the Supreme Court 's decision in Mapp, which extended the 
federal exclusionary rule to s t a t e criminal prosecutions, t h i s 
Court, af ter a de ta i led ana lys is of the quest ion, expressly held 
t ha t evidence should not be excluded even though i t was obtained 
as a r e su l t of an i l l e g a l search and se izure . S ta te v. Aime, 62 
Utah 476, 478-b5, 220 P. 704, 705-08 (1923). See also State v. 
Fa i r , 10 Utah 2d 365, 353 P.2d 615 (1960). This posi t ion was in 
l ine with the majority view held by s t a t e courts a t tha t time. 
Aime, 62 Utah a t 480-81, 220 P. a t 706. I t was not u n t i l Mapp 
had been decided t ha t the Court recognized exclusion as the 
remedy for a v io la t ion of the fourth amendment or a r t i c l e I , 
sect ion 14. State v. Louden. 15 Utah 2d 64, 66, 387 P.2d 240, 
-29-
241-42 (1963) , vacated on other grounds. 379 U.S. 1 (1964) .12 
Since Louden, the Court has f a i th fu l ly applied the federa l ly 
fashioned exclusionary rule in criminal cases . E.g. State v. 
Galleoos. 712 P.2d 207 (Utah 1985); S ta t e v. Ha r r i s . 671 P.2d 175 
(Utah 1983). However, the Supreme Cour t ' s s ign i f ican t 
modification of t ha t r u l e in Leon, coupled with i t s clear 
statement t he re t ha t the ru le i s not cons t i t u t iona l ly required, 
gives t h i s Court every reason t o ful ly discuss the necessi ty of 
an exclusionary rule under the s t a t e cons t i tu t ion and t o explain 
why the recent ly adopted Rule 12(g) i s an appropriate r u l e . 
Three major r a t iona le s for the exclusionary rule in 
search-and-seizure cases have developed in the case law and lega l 
l i t e r a t u r e : (1) t he remedial or personal r ight r a t i o n a l e ; (2) 
the j u d i c i a l i n t e g r i t y r a t i o n a l e ; and (3) the deterrence 
r a t i o n a l e . Coe, supra at 14-24. Although a lengthy discussion 
of each of these r a t iona le s i s not possible here , some a t t en t ion 
should be given them so t h a t a foundation may be l a i d for a 
meaningful ana lys i s of Rule 12(g)—a ru l e which r e t a i n s exclusion 
as a remedy where the search-and-seizure v io l a t i on i s both 
subs tan t i a l and not committed in good f a i t h . See Rule 12(g) (1) . 
1 2
 Louden could be read as adopting the exclusionary rule as the 
sole remedy for an unlawful search or seizure under the s t a t e 
cons t i t u t ion . However, by simply c i t i ng t o Ma pp. the Court 
appears to have lumped the s t a t e and federal provisions together 
without giving much thought to the independent s t a t e 
cons t i t u t i ona l quest ion. Therefore, the State bel ieves tha t 
Ju s t i c e Zimmerraan was correct in Hygh when he observed t h a t there 
appeared to be "no case in which t h i s Court ha[d] decided to 
adopt the exclusionary rule af ter independently analyzing the 
question of what remedy i s avai lable for unlawful search or 
se izure under our Sta te Cons t i tu t ion . " 711 P.2d a t 273. 
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The remedial or personal r ight r a t iona le embraces the 
notion that the exclusion of evidence i s a r ight inherent in the 
personal cons t i tu t iona l r ight to be free from unreasonable 
searches and se izures . However, despite some degree of support, 
the remedied or compensatory j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the exclusionary 
rule has generally been re jec ted . Coe, supra a t 15; Schroeder, 
supra at 1426. But see State v. Johnson. 716 P.2d a t 1297 n. 11 ; 
S ta te v. Grawein, 123 Wis.2d 428, 431-32, 367 N.W.2d 816, 817-18 
(Wis. App. 1985) (c i t ing S ta te v. Kreiqbaum, 194 Wis. 229, 232, 
215 N.W. 896, 897-98 (1927)); S ta te v. White, 97 Wash.2d 92, 110, 
640 P.2d 1061, 1071 (1982). A frequently c i ted flaw in t h i s 
theory i s that the tex t of the fourth amendment does not d i r ec t ly 
requi re exclusion; nor i s the re anything in the events giving 
r i se t o the adoption of the fourth amendment that supports the 
view tha t i t was intended to require exclusion. Stewart, supra 
a t 1381. As noted e a r l i e r , the Supreme Court c lear ly re jected 
t h i s theory in Leon, 468 U.S. a t 906. Because a r t i c l e I , section 
14, l i k e the fourth amendment, contains no textual requirement 
for exclusion and there appears t o be nothing in the his tory of 
i t s adoption to indica te tha t exclusion of evidence would be 
required for a v io la t ion of the provision, t h i s Court should 
again r e j ec t the remedial or personal r ight ra t iona le as a 
cons t i tu t iona l basis for the exclusionary ru le , as i t did, for 
al l p rac t i ca l purposes, in Aime, 62 Utah a t 480-85, 220 P. 706-
08 . 
The theory tha t exclusion i s necessary to preserve 
j u d i c i a l i n t eg r i t y has also received much c r i t i c i sm and has 
general ly played only a minor ro le in the development of the 
exclusionary r u l e . Coe, supra a t 17. The notion underlying t h i s 
theory was perhaps best a r t i c u l a t e d in the dissent of Jus t i ce 
Brandeis in Olmstead v. United S t a t e s . 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J . , d i s sen t ing ) : 
Our Government i s the potent f the omnipresent 
teacher . For good or for i l l f i t teaches the 
whole people by i t s example. . . . If the 
Government becomes a lawbreaker i t breeds 
contempt for law; i t i n v i t e s every man to 
become a law unto himself; i t i n v i t e s anarchy. 
In t h a t same case, Just ice Holmes wrote in h i s dissent ing 
opinion: 
We have to choose, and for my par t I think 
i t l e s s evil that some criminals should 
escape than t ha t the Government should play 
an ignoble pa r t . 
277 U.S. a t 470. 
Although some courts continue to recognize the j ud i c i a l 
i n t e g r i t y r a t iona le as the most compelling j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the 
exclusionary ru le , see* e .g . . State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J. 
Super, a t 244, 491 A.2d a t 45, i t i s subject t o the same a t tack 
as i s the personal r ight r a t i o n a l e — i . e . , there appears t o be no 
cons t i tu t iona l bas is for i t , e i ther t ex tua l ly or h i s t o r i c a l l y . 
Stewart, supra at 1383. Hi s to r i ca l ly , courts have in a var ie ty 
of circumstances admitted i l l e g a l l y obtained evidence, apparently 
not overly concerned t h a t to do so would necessar i ly involve the 
court in "dir ty bus iness ." I b i d . ; Stone v. Powellt 428 U.S. 465, 
486 (1976) (observing t h a t the fourth amendment "has never been 
in te rpre ted to proscribe the introduct ion of i l l e g a l l y seized 
evidence in a l l proceedings or against a l l persons") ; Coe, supra 
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at 17 . This c r i t i c i s m appears sound, and although there i s a 
good deal of merit t o the value judgment inherent in the j u d i c i a l 
i n t e g r i t y doctr ine , i t does not provide a sound cons t i tu t iona l 
bas i s for the exclusionary r u l e . Indeed, the j u d i c i a l i n t e g r i t y 
r a t i o n a l e was e x p l i c i t l y rejected as an independent 
cons t i tu t iona l bas i s for the exclusionary rule by the Supreme 
Court in Michigan v . Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 , 450 n. 25 (1974) . The 
t e x t and his tory of a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 14 demand no d i f f erent 
conclusion by t h i s Court. 
The deterrence ra t iona le i s with l i t t l e doubt the most 
widely accepted j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the exclusionary ru l e . In 
Leon, the Supreme Court made clear that i t perceived deterrence 
as the only purpose for the r u l e . 468 U.S. at 906. Numerous 
s t a t e courts have taken a s imilar pos i t i on regarding t h e i r own 
exclusionary r u l e s . See , e . g . , Mers v. S t a t e , 482 N. E.2d 778, 
782-83 (Ind. App. 1985); S ta te v. Wood, 457 So.2d 206, 210-11 
(La. App. 1984); S ta te v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 391-92, 630 P.2d 
674, 678-79 (1981) , cer t , denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (recognizing 
tha t , although other reasons for i t s use e x i s t , the primary 
purpose of Idaho's exclusionary rule i s t o deter pol ice 
misconduct). The Leon dec i s ion and a number of s ta te court 
opinions , e . g . State v . Brown, 708 So.2d at 146; Stringer v . 
S t a t e , 491 So.2d 837, 847 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J . , 
concurring) , r e f l e c t the majority, and probably better reasoned, 
view that the deterrence r a t i o n a l e , l i k e the other r a t i o n a l e s , 
has no readi ly d i scern ib le bas i s in the federal cons t i tu t ion or 
the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n s . On the other hand, J u s t i c e Potter 
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Stewart has a r t i c u l a t e d what i s perhaps the most compelling 
counterargument to tha t view: 
To give effect t o the Cons t i tu t ion ' s prohi-
b i t ion agains t i l l e g a l searches and se i zu res , 
i t may be necessary for the judic iary to 
remove the incent ive for v io l a t ing i t . flius, 
i t may be argued t h a t although the Consti tu-
t ion does not e x p l i c i t l y provide for exclu-
sion, the need to enforce the Cons t i tu t ion ' s 
l i m i t s on government—to preserve the rule 
of law—requires an exclusionary ru le . Under 
t h i s th i rd "doct r ina l" bas is for the exclu-
sionary ru le , which has been described as 
"cons t i tu t iona l common law," the exclusion of 
uncons t i tu t iona l ly obtained evidence i s not 
a cons t i tu t iona l r ight but a cons t i tu t iona l 
remedy. I t i s a r igh t only in the sense 
tha t every remedy ves t s a r ight in those 
who may claim i t . 
Stewart, supra at 1384. But even he qua l i f ied h i s argument by 
s t a t i n g : 
Under such an approach, the determination 
whether the exclusionary ru l e i s cons t i tu -
t i ona l ly required turns on whether there are 
other adequate remedies avai lable t o ensure 
t h a t the government does not v i o l a t e the 
fourth amendment a t i t s p leasure . 
I b i d . 
Assuming t h a t t h i s Court i s among those courts t h a t see 
deterrence of pol ice misconduct as the primary purpose of the 
exclusionary ru le , a reasonable assumption given i t s recent 
adoption of Rule 12(g) (which, as discussed in more de t a i l below, 
i s a deterrence-or iented, modified exclusionary r u l e ) , the Court 
should e x p l i c i t l y hold tha t an exclusionary r u l e , in any form, i s 
not required e i the r by a r t i c l e I , sect ion 14, or any other 
provision in the s t a t e cons t i tu t ion , on a theory tha t exclusion 
i s a cons t i tu t iona l remedy premised upon the deterrence doct r ine . 
Although J u s t i c e Stewar t ' s cons t i tu t iona l theory regarding the 
- 3 4 -
deterrence ra t iona le i s not without some force , by adopting i t 
the Court would unnecessarily entangle i t s e l f in a l e s s than 
c lear cons t i tu t iona l ana lys i s . Elevating a quest ion in to the 
realm of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l quest ion , when that i s avoidable, i s 
not the preferred course. See State v . Wood > 648 P.2d 7 1 , 82 
(Utah 1982) , c e r t , denied, 459 U.S. 988. The preferable course 
for t h i s Court would be to do as the Supreme Court did in Leon 
and recognize that t h i s s t a t e 1 s exclusionary rule—which i s 
embodied in Rule 12(g)—operates as a j u d i c i a l l y created remedy 
designed to safeguard a r t i c l e I , s ec t ion 14 r ights through i t s 
deterrent e f f e c t , rather than a personal cons t i tu t iona l right of 
the aggrieved person. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. Under t h i s 
approach, future modif icat ions of Rule 1 2 ( g ) , including the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of t o t a l l y abandoning exc lus ion of evidence as a 
remedy for search-and-seizure v i o l a t i o n s , are more e a s i l y 
analyzed and adopted.*3 
Fina l ly , although the Court might a l so embrace the 
j u d i c i a l i n t e g r i t y rat ionale as an addit ional nonconst i tut ional 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the exclusionary rule , s e e , e . g . , Johnson, 716 
P.2d at 1298, that would not be completely cons i s tent with the 
tenor of Rule 1 2 ( g ) , which al lows the admission of i l l e g a l l y 
obtained evidence so long as the v i o l a t i o n was insubstant ia l and 
committed in good f a i t h . In short , of the three that have been 
13 por ins tance , i f the Court were to conclude at some future 
date that adequate a l t e r n a t i v e remedies to the exclusionary rule 
e x i s t , i t could simply abandon the rule through i t s rule-making 
funct ion without having t o expla in why a rule once required by 
the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n was no longer so required. 
discussed , the deterrence r a t i o n a l e , viewed as a 
nonconst i tut ional doctr ine , provides the c l e a r e s t j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
for the exclusionary rule contained in Rule 1 2 ( g ) . 
Having addressed the quest ion of whether an 
exclusionary rule i s required under e i ther the fourth amendment 
or a r t i c l e I , s e c t i o n 14, the next quest ion i s whether Rule 12(g) 
i s a permiss ible remedy for a v i o l a t i o n of a defendant's r i g h t s 
under the federal and s ta te prov i s ions . Because a s t a t e i s free 
t o fashion whatever rule i t de s i re s concerning v i o l a t i o n s of i t s 
s ta t e cons t i tu t iona l provis ion that are not a l so v i o l a t i o n s of 
the fourth amendment, the ana lys i s of t h i s i s sue w i l l focus on 
whether Rule 12(g) provides a permiss ible remedy for v i o l a t i o n s 
of the fourth amendment. By proceeding in t h i s way, the S ta te i s 
assuming that the Court, by adopting Rule 1 2 ( g ) , b e l i e v e s i t to 
be an acceptable rule under s t a t e law for v i o l a t i o n s of a r t i c l e 
I , s ec t i on 14. Thus, i f the Court were to determine that cer ta in 
po l i ce conduct v i o l a t e d a r t i c l e I , s ec t i on 14 even though i t did 
not v i o l a t e the fourth amendment, presumably Rule 12(g) would be 
the contro l l ing rule on the i ssue of suppression. 
Under the Mapp ru l ing , as modified by Leon, the 
individual s t a t e s are obl igated t o apply the federal exclusionary 
rule in cases of a fourth amendment v i o l a t i o n . If federal law 
requires exc lus ion under the f a c t s presented, the s t a t e court 
must exclude the evidence. In short , a s t a t e may not have a more 
narrow exclusionary rule than the federal rule when a fourth 
amendment v i o l a t i o n i s a t i s s u e . Str inger v. Statg* 491 So.2d a t 
847 (Robertson, J . , concurring) . Therefore, i t must be 
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determined whether Rule 1 2 ( g ) , which obviously appl ies t o 
v i o l a t i o n s of the fourth amendment, can be applied in a manner 
cons i s tent with federal law. 
Rule 12(g) appears t o be a hybrid rule which combines 
the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y t e s t suggested by the American Law I n s t i t u t e 
i n i t s MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (1975) , see 
general ly Coe, supra, and the good f a i t h except ion to the 
exclusionary rule ar t i cu la ted by the Supreme Court in Leon 
(warrant context) and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
United S t a t e s v . Will iams . 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) , c er t , 
denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981) (warrantless contex t ) . I t r e f l e c t s 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with automatic exc lus ion (which does not consider 
what deterrent e f f e c t , i f any, exc lus ion w i l l have in the given 
case) as the remedy for every search-and-seizure v i o l a t i o n , the 
cos t s of which can be extremely high. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08; 
Stone v . Powell» 428 U.S. at 490 ("The d i spar i ty in part icular 
cases between the error committed by the po l i ce o f f i cer and the 
windfal l afforded a g u i l t y defendant by appl icat ion of the rule 
i s contrary to the idea of proport ional i ty that i s e s s e n t i a l t o 
the concept of j u s t i c e . " ) ; Schroeder, supra at 1424-25 
(summarizing the perceived c o s t s of the exclusionary rule as 
fo l lows: "(1) fos ter ing delay in the system of j u s t i c e ; (2) 
encouraging po l ice perjury; (3) d ivert ing the a t t en t ion of the 
par t i c ipants in a criminal case from the quest ion of g u i l t or 
innocence; (4) free ing the g u i l t y ; and (5) generating d i srespect 
for the law and the administration of j u s t i c e by granting 
windfal l benef i t s to certain gu i l ty defendants" (footnote 
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c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) ) . Instead r i t re ta ins exc lus ion as a remedy 
for a substant ia l and bad f a i t h v i o l a t i o n , recognizing that a 
benef i c ia l deterrent e f f ec t i s r ea l i zed through exclus ion only 
under appropriate circumstances. Thus, Rule 12(g) embraces a 
p r i n c i p l e that was central to the dec i s ion in Leon; avoidance of 
the high c o s t s of the exclusionary rule where exc lus ion would not 
e f f e c t i v e l y deter pol ice misconduct. As s ta ted in Leon; 
lElven assuming that the rule e f f e c t i v e l y 
de ters some pol ice misconduct and provides 
i n c e n t i v e s for the law enforcement profess ion 
as a whole to conduct i t s e l f in accord with 
the Fourth Amendment, i t cannot be expected, 
and should not be appl ied, to deter object -
ive ly reasonable law enforcement a c t i v i t y . 
468 U.S. at 918-19. £ £ . Stewart, supra at 1394 n. 155; Oaks, 
"Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Se izure ," 37 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 665 ( 1 9 7 0 ) — c r i t i c s of the exclusionary rule who 
f o r c e f u l l y argue that i t does not in fact deter unconst i tut ional 
po l ice conduct. Addi t ional ly , because the rule operates in 
conjunction with UTAH CODE ANN. SS 78-16-1 through -11 (Supp. 
1986) , which provide a c i v i l remedy for the defendant whose 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r ights have been v io la t ed ,14 i t s mandate for 
l imi t ed exc lus ion i s cons i s tent with the wel l reasoned view that , 
i f adequate a l t e r n a t i v e remedies e x i s t , exc lus ion becomes l e s s 
necessary. See Bivens v . Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents , 
403 U.S. 388, 422-23 (1971) (Burger, C.J . , d i s sent ing) (out l in ing 
an a l t e r n a t i v e remedial scheme to the exclusionary r u l e ) . 
14 An aggrieved defendant could a l s o seek damages from the po l ice 
o f f i cer under the federal Civ i l Rights Act , 42 U.S.C. S 1983 
(1982) . 
- 3 8 -
Although the language of Rule 12(g) does not precisely 
track the good fa i th exception a r t i cu l a t ed in Leon and Williams, 
the g i s t of Utah's substant ia l i ty /good fa i th rule i s the same as 
tha t set out in those cases ; and t h i s Court, through case law, 
can ensure tha t i t i s applied in a manner consistent with federal 
law.*5 For ins tance , in Leon t;he Court a t one point s ta ted in 
reference to appl ica t ion of the exclusionary ru le : 
Par t i cu la r ly when law enforcement off icers 
have acted in objective good fa i th or t he i r 
t ransgress ions have been minor, the magnitude 
of the benefit conferred on such gui l ty defen-
dants offends basic concepts of the criminal j u s t i c e system. 
468 U.S. at 907-08 (c i t ing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 490) 
(emphasis added). I t further noted: 
The Court has, to be sure, not ser iously ques-
t ioned, "in the absence of a more efficacious 
sanction, the continued appl icat ion of the rule 
to suppress evidence from the [prosecut ion 's] 
case where a Fourth Amendment v io la t ion has 
been subs tan t i a l and de l ibe ra t e . . . . " Franks 
v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978); Stone v. 
Powell, syprfl, a t 492. 
*
5
 Some of the quest ions t h a t were asked the S t a t e ' s counsel 
during oral argument in S ta te v. Mendoza, Case No. 20922 (argued 
June 12, 1986) , suggest t h a t cer ta in members of the Court may not 
be en t i r e ly s a t i s f i ed with the language of Rule 12(g). However, 
i t i s the Court ' s ru l e , and i f the ru le i s not s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
worded, the Court should amend i t . Aware of the possible 
concerns in t h i s regard, a t torneys from the Attorney General 's 
Office plan to meet with representa t ives from the Statewide 
Association of Prosecutors and other members of the law 
enforcement community to discuss Rule 12(g) and perhaps pe t i t i on 
for a ru le change, as the S ta te has done with respect to Utah R. 
Crim. P. 27 (see In Re: Rule 27, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, S t a t e ' s Pe t i t ion for Amendment to Rule (f i led February 
19, 1986)). If such a pe t i t i on i s f i l e d , the S ta te wi l l a t tha t 
same time submit a complete memorandum discussing the 
exclusionary ru le and possible a l t e rna t ives to i t . But for now, 
the S ta te recognizes t h a t the Court has adopted current Rule 
12(g) , and therefore wi l l l imi t i t s discussion here to the legal j u s t i f i c a t i o n s for tha t r u l e . 
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I d . at 908-09 (emphasis added). £s& also McFarland v . S t a t e , 284 
Ark. 533, 549, 684 S.W.2d 233, 243 (1985) (c i t ing Leon with 
approval in applying ArKansas's subs tant ia l v io la t ion ru le for 
suppression of evidence (A.R.Cr.P. 16.2(e)—a rule patterned 
after the ALTs subs t an t i a l i t y t e s t ) ) . 
Furthermore, tha t the Supreme Court has not 
spec i f i ca l ly held t h a t the Leon good fa i th exception would apply 
in a warrant less context, as Rule 12(g) obviously would, the 
Cour t ' s general discussion in t h a t case about the propriety of a 
good fa i th exception strongly suggests that such an extension of 
Leon would be both acceptable and des i rab le . See 46 8 U.S. at 
918-19. 
Some courts have adopted a form of good fa i th exception 
to the exclusionary ru le in a warrant less search or seizure 
context . See, e.g.# United S ta te s v. Wyler, 502 F.Supp. 969, 
973-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The leading case i s s t i l l Williams where 
the Fifth Circui t held t h a t evidence seized from the defendant 
incident t o a warrant less a r r e s t , which was ul t imately determined 
to have been unlawful, should not be excluded because "evidence 
i s not to be suppressed under the exclusionary ru le where i t i s 
discovered by of f icers in the course of act ions t h a t a re taken in 
good fa i th and in the reasonable, though mistaken, belief that 
they are author ized." 622 F.2d a t 840. The court analyzed the 
appropriateness of a good fa i th exception in much the same way 
tha t the Supreme Court did in Leon* emphasizing t h a t the 
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary ru l e i s not furthered if 
the ru le i s applied to s i t ua t i ons where police off icers have 
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acted in the good fa i th belief that t he i r conduct i s lawful. 622 
F.2d a t 842. Numerous court6 have c i ted Williams with approval. 
E.g. United S ta tes v. Cotton. 751 P.2d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (10th Cir . 
1985) j ppnovan Yt Federal Clearing pie Casting cptr 695 p.2d 
1020, 1023-24 (7th Cir . 1982); United S ta tes v. Nolan. 530 
F.Supp. 386, 398 (W.D. Pa. 1981), a f f ' d , 718 F.2d 589 (3d Ci r . 
1983); S ta te v. Verkuylen, 120 Wis.2d 59, 352 N.W.2d 668 (Wis. 
App. 1982); S ta te v. Glass , 9 Ohio Misc.2d 10, 1 1 , 458 N.E.2d 
1302, 1304 (Ohio Com. PI. 1983). In short , the Williams opinion 
embodies the logica l extension of Leon in to the area of 
warrant less searches and se izu res . I t i s d i f f i c u l t to conceive 
of any compelling reason why the Supreme Court would not apply 
the Leon rule in a case where an o f f i c e r ' s warrant less conduct, 
subsequently determined to be in v io la t ion of the fourth 
amendment, was object ively reasonable under the circumstances. 
See I .N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1055-56 (1984) 
(White, J . , d i s sen t ing) ; People v. Deitchman* 695 P.2d 1146, 1153 
(Colo. 1985) (Erickson, C.J . , concurring) (observing tha t 
Colorado's s ta tu tory "good f a i t h " exception to the exclusionary 
ru l e i s consis tent with fourth amendment precedent and does not 
v i o l a t e federal cons t i tu t iona l s tandards) ; Bloom, "United S ta tes 
v. Leon And I t s Ramifications," 56 Colo. L. Rev. 247, 259-61 
(1985). But see United S ta tes v. Whiting, 781 F.2d 692, 698-99 
(9th C i r . 1986) (refusing t o extend Leon ra t iona le to warrant less 
s i t u a t i o n ) ; Greenhalgh, "The Warrantless Good Faith Exception— 
Unprecedented, Indefensible , and Devoid of Necessi ty," 26 S. Tex. 
L.J . 129 (1985). 
F i n a l l y , although i t does not bear on the federal 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e and r e l a t e s only t o the appropriateness of 
Rule 12(g) under the s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n (which, as noted e a r l i e r , 
should not be an i s s u e in that the Court, by adopting Rule 1 2 ( g ) , 
presumably b e l i e v e s that the rule does not create any s t a t e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l problems), i t i s worth noting that a number of 
courts have adopted the freon good f a i t h exception as part of 
the ir s t a t e exclusionary r u l e . S ta te v. Brown* 708 So.2d at 145-
46; Mers v . S t a t e , 482 N.E.2d at 782-83; McFarland v . S t a t e , 284 
Ark. a t 549, 684 S.W.2d at 243; S ta te v. Wood, 457 So.2d at 210-
11? S ta te v . Bo l t , 142 Ariz. 260 , 689 P.2d 519 (1984) . But see 
People v. Biqelow, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630 , 636-37, 488 N.E.2d 451 , 457-
58 (1985); S t a t e v . Novembrino, 200 N.J. Super. 229, 491 A.2d 37 
(1985); S ta te v. Houston, 359 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Minn. App. 1 9 8 4 ) - -
case s r e j e c t i n g Leon on s t a t e cons t i tu t iona l grounds. 
Based upon the foregoing d i scuss ion and the probable 
cause ana lys i s s e t forth in subsect ion A, the t r i a l court should 
not have excluded the challenged evidence under Rule 1 2 ( g ) . 
There simply was no showing that Cazier 1 s search pursuant t o a 
warrant cons t i tu ted a subs tant ia l and bad f a i t h v i o l a t i o n of 
defendant's r i g h t s . The warrant i ssued e i ther was supported by 
probable cause (thus no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n when Cazier 
executed i t ) , or i f determined t o be inva l id due to the technical 
inadequacy of Cazier1 s a f f i d a v i t , was reasonably r e l i e d upon by 
the o f f i cer who, under an objec t ive reasonableness t e s t , had no 
b a s i s for be l i ev ing that the warrant was i n v a l i d . Seg UTAH CDDE 
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ANN. 77-23-12 (1982) . 1 6 Also, the t r i a l court was not obl igated 
to conclude from the evidence before i t that the o f f i c e r s 
• intimidated" and "terrorized" defendant's mother before she 
allowed them t o look at defendant's truck, and that t h i s rendered 
the subsequent search inva l id because of the o f f i c e r s 1 bad f a i t h . 
See Br. of App. at 19-20. The court was free t o a s s e s s the 
testimony of the wi tnesses at the suppression hearing and t o draw 
from that whatever reasonable inferences i t wished. See S ta te v. 
Kaae, 30 Utah 2d 73 , 75-76 , 513 P.2d 435 , 436-37 (1973). Ms. 
Babbell never t e s t i f i e d that she was e i ther intimidated or 
terror ized by the o f f i c e r s or that she re luc tant ly allowed them 
t o examine defendant's truck (R. 147-56, 439-40) . She merely 
s tated that she would not have allowed the two men t o look at 
defendant's truck if she had known they were po l i ce o f f i cer s (R. 
153) . In f a c t , contrary to defendant's a s s e r t i o n s , Ms. Babbell 
t e s t i f i e d that the a l leged of fens ive comment concerning the 
shooting of her son did not occur unt i l the o f f i c e r s second v i s i t 
t o her home, wel l after the ir f i r s t v i s i t when they had received 
permission t o examine defendant's truck (R. 147 -52 ) . 
1 6
 Section 77-23-12 provides: 
Pursuant t o the standards described in sec t ion 77-35-12 (g) 
property or evidence se ized pursuant t o a search warrant s h a l l 
not be suppressed at a motion, t r i a l , or other proceeding unless 
the unlawful conduct of the peace o f f i cer i s shown to be 
s u b s t a n t i a l . Any unlawful search or se izure sha l l be considered 
subs tant ia l and in bad f a i t h if the warrant was obtained with 
mal ic ious purpose and without probable cause or was executed 
mal ic ious ly and w i l l f u l l y beyond the authority of the warrant or 
with unnecessary s e v e r i t y . 
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